Missing link: Federal government's symbolic policy conceals enforcement deficits

Contents

Germany has experienced a series of serious attacks in recent years, from the Islamist terror attack on Berlin's Breitscheidplatz in 2016 to the racist attack in Hanau in 2020. The knife attack in Würzburg in 2021 and, most recently, the attack on the Magdeburg Christmas market in 2018. 2024. After each of these events, the German government responded by tightening the law, such as the BND Act, the State Trojan Act and the reform of the BKA Act. Most recently, the Federal Council called for the rapid introduction of data analysis software as an "interim solution" for predictive policing in the police.

However, a precise analysis of these cases reveals a recurring pattern: it was not a lack of federal legislation, but rather enforcement deficits in the area of responsibility of the respective state interior ministries that were decisive. The federal government reacted with symbolic measures, although it has no influence on operational police work on the ground in Germany's federal security architecture.

"Missing Link"

What's missing: In the fast-paced world of technology, we often don't have time to sort through all the news and background information. At the weekend, we want to take this time to follow the side paths away from the current affairs, try out other perspectives and make nuances audible.

• All our the "Missing Links"

Enforcement deficits at state level

Decisions in the Berlin LKA to discontinue surveillance played a role in the 2016 Breitscheidplatz attack, as did communication problems between various security authorities. The manipulation of files that was later discovered points to problems within the organization.

In Hanau 2020, the police hotline in the area of responsibility of the South-East Hesse Police Headquarters was overloaded – a resource problem at municipal level, but ultimately the responsibility of the Hessian Ministry of the Interior. In Würzburg 2021, several authorities made misjudgements: Although a psychiatric facility issued a warning, the local court responsible refused to provide care.

In the attack on the Magdeburg Christmas market in 2024, five approaches to the threat were unsuccessful, a problem with operational police work on the ground. However, the lack of networking between the more than 100 reports from different federal states points to a structural problem in the federal system: the lack of coordination across federal states when assessing dangerous situations.

The cases examined reveal local enforcement deficits, problems within the authorities and structural coordination weaknesses. It is worth noting that the legal instruments for prevention were available – but were not applied consistently. This is by no means to be understood as a blanket criticism of the security authorities. On the contrary: in numerous other cases, functioning communication channels and cooperation between authorities have successfully prevented attacks. However, the cases described clearly show where the actual problems lie.

The federal dilemma

The Basic Law stipulates that the legislative competence in these areas lies in principle with the federal states. The federal government has no regulatory competence for general police and regulatory law. In Germany, internal security is the responsibility of the federal states. With around 220,000 state police officers compared to around 34,000 federal police officers, the 16 state police forces form the backbone of the security architecture.

There are historical reasons for this federal division: After the experiences of the Nazi era, there was a conscious decision not to concentrate power in federal hands. "The police are a matter for the federal states" is therefore a fundamental principle. The federal government only has a comparatively narrow range of responsibilities – such as border protection (federal police) or the prosecution of certain crimes by the Federal Criminal Police Office. However, the federal government lacks the constitutional authority for regular domestic security.

This structural impotence of federal policy explains why federal governments often resort to legislative substitute measures after attacks. However, this does not solve the actual problem on the ground – where there is a lack of contact with people at risk, a lack of networking of tip-offs or unmanned emergency lines –.

Where the lack of networking of information or tip-offs was the cause, new coordination platforms are quickly called for. This ignores the fact that this task is clearly regulated by law. Section 1 (1) of the Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office and Cooperation between the Federal Government and the Länder in Criminal Police Matters (BKAG) states: "The Federal Government shall maintain a Federal Criminal Police Office for cooperation between the Federal Government and the Länder in criminal police matters."

This sentence alone makes it clear that the BKA is responsible for networking the state authorities and coordinating law enforcement across state borders. Once again calling for "better coordination between the federal states" is an admission that the BKA also has an enforcement deficit.

Predictive policing is not a solution either

The call for data analysis platforms such as Palantir is directly linked to the problems identified. Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse are already using the software. The Magdeburg case in particular, with its more than 100 documented reports, makes it clear that the fragmentation of information across different authorities and federal states makes it difficult to assess the overall threat situation.

The company Palantir promises what was missing in all four cases analyzed: the early detection of threats through the systematic evaluation of existing information. Algorithms could establish connections between isolated incidents that escape human analysts and trigger automated warnings in the event of risk patterns.

This is also a task for the German police forces. The "Police 2020" program was announced back in 2005. The aim was to merge the databases of the state police forces into an information network called "PIAV". This project has not yet been completed in 2025 – This will happen "in 2030 at the earliest", according to security circles.

Police data to the USA

Instead of completing this project at full speed, an American company with a history of surveillance is to get the cow off the ice. However, none of those responsible seem to find it problematic to give a US company access to the data of German police authorities, which can then use it to train its AI.

From the perspective of the state authorities, it's simple: they leave the laborious work of integrating the various data sources to Palantir instead of taking on this task themselves. The use of Palantir's software, which is highly questionable in terms of civil rights, is therefore also an expression of an enforcement deficit at state level.

A pattern can often be observed after serious security incidents: Public expectation is primarily directed at federal policy, although operational responsibility lies with the state governments. While the federal government comes more into focus through visible reactions and media presence, the states are less typically at the center of the discussion.

This results in a discrepancy: federal policy measures convey the ability to act, but cannot influence the structural challenges at the state level. This entails the risk that the rule of law at the federal level is overloaded with far-reaching but ineffective powers, while implementation problems persist at local level.

Allocate responsibility appropriately

A precise allocation of responsibilities is crucial for an effective security policy debate. Police work and security are the responsibility of the interior ministries of the federal states. Only at this level can sustainable reforms be introduced and implemented in a targeted manner. It is therefore important not to focus the discussion prematurely on federal politicians after security-related incidents, but to hold the responsible state ministries accountable.

Symbolic political measures at the federal level may appear politically effective, but they are no substitute for structural improvements at the state level, where the causes of specific failures are too often to be found. Necessary reforms must be initiated where they can actually be effective – so that fundamental rights such as freedom and security remain equally protected.

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