Leaky data protection in the online service "My judicial mailbox"
"My justice mailbox" is to simplify communication with the justice system digitally. However, users' personal data can be viewed centrally by many people.
(Image: TierneyMJ/Shutterstock.com)
In autumn 2023, politicians praised the online service Mein Justizpostfach as the new ideal way for "digital, legally secure and free communication with the judiciary". Citizens have recently been able to use it, for example, to file a lawsuit in the area of air passenger rights via an online civil law procedure. In the future, it should also be possible to collect smaller amounts in dispute cost-effectively. However, this convenience comes at the expense of data protection: users' personal information is made accessible to numerous employees in the judicial system in a central directory. This invites abuse.
BundID as a bone of contention
The stumbling block: anyone who wants to make use of the MJP not only needs the controversial BundID, which has already been affected by data leaks. Users are also automatically entered in the so-called SAFE directory service. According to those responsible, this "secure" register, which is operated by the judiciary and various chambers such as the Chamber of Lawyers and Notaries, contains users' first and last names, addresses and country codes. According to the Ordinance on Electronic Legal Transactions (ERVV), this data must be available in its entirety to clearly identify senders.
According to estimates by IT security expert Markus Drenger, over one million people from the judiciary and holders of special electronic mailboxes have access to this directory. These include lawyers, notaries, tax consultants and public authorities, as the expert emphasized to Netzpolitik.org. The Baden-WĂĽrttemberg Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for operating the MJP, confirmed to the portal that this data must be accessible to comply with legal requirements. At the same time, it referred to the confidentiality obligations of those involved in electronic legal transactions.
Reporting block is being circumvented
Even in the MJP pilot operation, an incorrect setting in the system apparently made it possible for third parties to access third-party data. The SAFE directory was configured in such a way that citizens' information, which was supposed to remain protected, was publicly accessible. Affected users were only subsequently informed of the data leak via BundID.
Drenger now complains to Netzpolitik.org that it can be extremely risky for certain groups of people, such as stalking victims, journalists or witnesses to crimes, if their address data can be viewed in such a directory. He also sees good reasons for celebrities and politicians not to publish their private data. In the past, many citizens exercised their right to object "so that their name and telephone number would not appear in the telephone directory". Now the government expects "everyone's name and address to be listed in a quasi-public directory".
What is particularly serious is that the MJP is circumventing a registration block that citizens can apply for at the residents' registration office for security reasons. On the MJP website, there is only a brief warning that personal data from the BundID is transmitted to third parties even if the registration data is blocked and that its use is only conditionally suitable for such people. Only in the course of the further development of the MJP will it be possible to set up a mailbox in future without publishing the address.
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Function before data protection?
Considering the criticism, the Baden-WĂĽrttemberg Ministry of Justice wants to examine whether less data can be recorded in the MJP in the future. However, it emphasizes that "maintaining the necessary legal and functional requirements" has priority. This indicates that the functionality of the service currently takes precedence over data protection.
Drenger compares this approach to telling car drivers to drive safely, while at the same time manufacturers refrain from installing seat belts and airbags. He complains that the responsible authorities are deliberately accepting that people could be harmed by this practice.
No end-to-end encryption
Another known problem with the MJP is the lack of end-to-end encryption of communication. The leading justice department states that messages are transmitted cryptographically securely to the web client. According to Drenger, however, the messages remain readable for the operators of the mailboxes, similar to a traditional email service provider. Encryption is only used for the transport of the message.
(vbr)
