Von der Leyen flight: Lithuania warns EU of massive GPS interference

Contents

The incident involving the plane of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), in which the GPS signal is said to have been jammed over Bulgaria, among other places, has brought an already known threat into sharper focus: apparently Russian interference maneuvers in the area of satellite navigation. For Lithuania and other countries, especially in the Baltic states bordering Russia, such attacks are no longer a rarity. According to government representatives, they are a daily reality and part of systematic, hybrid warfare.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys has described the incident as a clear illustration of the threat. According to Politico, he emphasizes that these are not isolated incidents, but targeted, ongoing actions. These not only endanger civilian air, sea and land traffic, but also critical infrastructure. He accuses Russia of violating its international obligations.

Although the exact circumstances of the events surrounding von der Leyen's plane are currently being presented contradictorily by the authorities in Sofia and Brussels, the message from Lithuania is clear: the GPS disruptions are part of a long-term Russian strategy. The Lithuanian EU ambassador Nerijus Aleksiejūnas emphasizes that the neighboring countries have been struggling with this for years.

1033 Lithuanian incidents in August alone

The effects are far-reaching and affect the most diverse areas of daily life. For example, there have been reports of large ships refusing to enter the port of Klaipėda for safety reasons after their GPS signals were manipulated. Pilots are stressed, which is why the Lithuanian authorities are increasingly offering training for landings under such conditions. Even farmers are complaining about economic losses, as the interference affects their GPS-based equipment, for example for drainage systems.

In August alone, the Lithuanian communications regulator RRT documented more than 1,000 Lithuanian aircraft and 33 ships affected by navigation signal interference.

Systematic escalation

According to the report, the situation is coming to a head. The neighboring countries fear a further escalation. Aleksiejūnas points out that Russia is increasingly investing in these activities. The RRT data also showed an alarming increase in spoofing sources from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. While there were three of these in February, there were already 29 in August. These have a considerable range of up to 400 kilometers and could theoretically also affect regions such as Berlin and Brandenburg.

This development makes GPS jamming, in which the satellites' radio signal is disrupted, and spoofing a pan-European problem. In the latter case, previously recorded real or false satellite signals are sent out by a third party. Lithuanian officials warn that Russia is developing technologies that are likely to be used far beyond the Baltic States in the near future.

With the support of other member states, Lithuania put the issue on the EU agenda back in June to call for a collective response. Measures such as improved monitoring, targeted training and investment in resilient technologies are needed, they say. In addition, diplomatic efforts should be made to force Russia to comply with international law. Budrys also urges the imposition of strict sanctions and the initiation of international steps by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

Von der Leyen's GPS problem via Estonia

Ships sailing in the eastern Baltic Sea are at least partly responsible for the massive disruptions to satellite navigation systems that have been complained about since the end of 2023 at the latest. This is suggested by a study by Polish researchers. They identified jamming as the main cause. According to other findings, there is a jamming facility known as the "Baltic Jammer" in the former Königsberg, which is primarily aimed at air traffic.

The Flightradar24 portal points out that the Bulgarian incident still needs to be investigated. Von der Leyen's aircraft, which was on its way from Helsinki to Warsaw via an Estonian airbase on August 30th, had demonstrably already experienced GPS interference on this route over south-western Estonia at the level of the Gulf of Riga. These had only become apparent from the analysis of the original ADS-B data (Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast).

(nen)