Fortress in space: Europe arms satellites against cyberattacks and geopolitics

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In the Arctic desert of Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, a bulwark for European security is currently being built. Amidst ice and rock, the Lithuanian company Astrolight, with the support of the European Space Agency ESA, is constructing a new ground station that is set to revolutionize data exchange with orbit. This does not involve classic radio waves, which can be easily disrupted or intercepted. The facility is designed to use high-precision laser beams to transmit vast amounts of data from satellites to Earth quickly and securely.

According to a report by Politico, the project has high symbolic significance: Europe is massively upgrading its technology to defend itself against a comparatively new threat: cyberattacks in and above space ("Space Hacks").

For a long time, decision-makers viewed satellite infrastructure more as a kind of invisible technical service for everyday life, comparable to water or electricity supply. It is, and has long been, crucial for television, weather forecasting, and civilian navigation. This perspective has changed in recent years. Since 2022 at the latest, politicians have recognized space infrastructure as a strategic core element of national and continental security. At that time, a cyberattack on the Viasat satellite network coincided precisely with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and crippled the communication of Ukrainian armed forces and thousands of wind turbines in Germany.

The Arctic as a dangerous bottleneck

Satellites are now targets for espionage, electronic interference, and sabotage. The EU Commission warned in June that space is increasingly contested. Germany and Great Britain pointed to the growing danger from Russian and Chinese satellites, which have been regularly caught shadowing European objects in space at close range. In this environment, the vulnerability of the physical infrastructure on the ground becomes a critical factor.

The problem with the current European architecture becomes particularly evident in the Arctic. Astrolight CEO Laurynas Mačiulis explained to Politico that currently, around 80 percent of all European data traffic from space converges at a single, highly exposed location: Svalbard. Due to international treaties, the archipelago is used by various countries, including Russia.

While the ground station there is strategically located for polar orbits, it is geopolitically extremely vulnerable. It is connected to the global internet via a single undersea cable, which has been damaged under mysterious circumstances multiple times in the recent past. If this line fails, Europe will suddenly lose access to the most important data from the Copernicus and Galileo systems.

The new laser station in Greenland is therefore intended to serve as a technologically upgraded alternative. In spring 2025, Astrolight was able to complete a funding round of 2.8 million euros. The company is developing a dual-use communication architecture that enables optical connections between space stations as well as between space and Earth. The goal is to offer optical communication as a service and to connect Astrolight's optical terminals and those of other providers with its own ground infrastructure.

Sovereignty instead of dependence on billionaires

Sovereignty on the ground is only one side of the coin; the other is independence in orbit. A central component of European ambitions is the "Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellites" (IRIS2). The multi-billion euro constellation is considered a response to Elon Musk's Starlink system. Experts like former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen often emphasize how dangerous the current dependence on private US actors is. It has become clear in Ukraine that the vital communication of an entire country can, in doubt, depend on the personal views and geopolitical assessments of a US billionaire.

IRIS2 is intended to consist of hundreds of satellites and enable encrypted broadband communication. The goal is a system that cannot be decrypted even if signals are theoretically intercepted by quantum technologies and that withstands the strictest national security certifications. However, it will be at least four more years before IRIS2 is fully operational. During this transition phase, the European flank remains wide open: the vulnerable point in the satellite sky is no longer a theoretical scenario.

Filling the organizational vacuum

At the same time, Europe is struggling with organizational and legal hurdles. Responsibilities for space defense are often diffusely divided between newly established space commands, such as those of the Bundeswehr and other armies, and traditional national cyber units. Clémence Poirier from the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich calls for closer coordination and clear mandates. It is no longer just about observing space debris, but about the ability to conduct defensive and, in an emergency, offensive cyber operations in orbit.

The security industry is also lagging behind the threat situation. Many traditional cybersecurity companies do not yet consider space as a distinct sector. Instead, satellite services are often categorized into conventional areas such as environment, media, or general broadband services. This fragmentation makes it difficult for operators to develop defense tools tailored to space. The construction site in the Greenlandic cold is thus just one of many locations in a largely invisible conflict.

(hob)