Iran War: GPS jamming in the Persian Gulf reaches new escalation level
With the war against Iran, GPS jamming has reached a new level. Over 1650 ships registered falsified data, increasing the risk of collision.
The map from GPSJAM.org reveals the current extent of GNSS signal interference. Compared to the Baltic Sea, the situation in the Persian Gulf appears minor – however, according to experts, the interference there has reached an unprecedented scale.
(Image: GPSJAM.org)
With the war against Iran, GPS jamming in the region has also reached a new level of escalation. On March 7th, falsified position data was registered for over 1650 ships – a 55 percent increase compared to the previous week. In addition to the danger from missiles and drones, shipping is also increasingly exposed to the risk of accidents because other ships can no longer be precisely located. At least air traffic has less of a problem with this: due to the closure of airspace over the Gulf region, it is largely rerouting widely.
The jamming of GPS signals, GPS jamming, or the transmission of falsified position data – GPS spoofing – has become standard practice in military conflicts. Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, vast areas over the eastern Baltic Sea and the Black Sea have been affected by this. The repeated military confrontations in the Middle East also lead to interference with satellite navigation in the eastern Mediterranean region.
30 jamming clusters discovered
According to the Israeli AI company Windward, which markets maritime surveillance solutions to shipping companies and authorities, the events around the Strait of Hormuz are reaching a new level. At least 30 jamming clusters have reportedly been discovered, spread across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Iran, both at sea and over land. While a week ago circular clusters of ships with false position data were observed, there are now zigzag lines.
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As is common in such conflicts, there are no declared responsibilities for the interference. Military analysts suspect Iran as the main cause of the interference. It could be using equipment of its production or from Russia or China. However, according to reports, the US armed forces also use jamming to protect their properties in the region from drones and GPS-guided weapons.
GNSS signals easily vulnerable
For shipping, the interference negatively affects the ship positioning system AIS (Automatic Identification System). Especially at night and in poor visibility, the risk of collision increases significantly. According to the British BBC, shipping companies are resorting to various extra systems, including the ice hockey puck-sized anti-jam antenna system Landshield from manufacturer Raytheon. Or to a solution from the Australian company Advanced Navigation, which determines the position via gyroscope and optical comparison with satellite images.
Once again, the interference reveals the vulnerability of navigation satellite signals. They are so weak that they can be easily disrupted. In addition, they are often unencrypted. Experts expect that open GNSS signals will eventually be replaced by secure alternatives. These encrypt the position data so that at least the falsification of data can be prevented.
(mki)
