“Cyber-Dome” with blind spots: What the goverment's plans leaves open

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Germany is planning to overhaul its digital defense system based on an Israeli model, which the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) considers “one of the technologically leading countries worldwide.” The BMI intends to collaborate closely with Israel on the concept, which is slated for completion by the end of 2026, and to benefit from its “experience in the automated detection and mitigation of cyberattacks [...].”

While the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) promotes the “Cyber-Dome” as a necessary protective shield against hybrid attacks, key details regarding its architecture, data flows, and constitutional limits remain unclear. The German government's response to a minor inquiry by the Left Party faction (PDF), co-authored by Jan Köstering, and further answers from the BMI indicate that much is still uncertain.

On almost all questions concerning the concrete technical implementation, involved companies, and the role of intelligence services, the BMI refers to confidentiality obligations or an ongoing planning process. Concrete details about the cooperation are, according to the BMI, “not yet finally coordinated internally within the government.”

Cyber Pact with Israel

The basis for the cooperation is a “Joint Declaration of Cooperation,” which Federal Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt signed in Jerusalem in January 2026. The cooperation is intended to proceed through topic- and task-dependent cooperation formats at the working level. What exactly is agreed upon there remains under wraps for the public so far. The first concrete step from this pact already took place in January with a training exercise for representatives of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in Israel, focusing on defending against a widespread cyberattack. A request from heise online for details, such as which AI systems were used and about the results, has so far gone unanswered by the BSI.

Digital Sovereignty?

The stated goal of the BMI is to establish a system in three clusters: an attack detection network, an analysis network for evaluation, and an “open ecosystem” for distributing warnings. Israeli know-how in automated detection and blocking is to be explicitly utilized. How this aligns with digital sovereignty is unclear, as the Israeli Cyber-Dome heavily relies on technologies from US hyperscalers like Google and data analysis platforms.

In response to the Left Party's question about what insights Dobrindt expects “regarding population and civil protection from an exchange with Israel, given the obviously entirely different geographical, political, and historical frameworks for population and civil protection in Israel and Germany,” the German government replies that the minister is focusing on “practical insights from a country with a high frequency of operations.” These experiences are not to be adopted one-to-one but are to be incorporated into domestic civil protection in an “analytical and adapted manner to German conditions.” Furthermore, in response to a question about whether cybersecurity measures have been increased, the BMI stated that the conflict in the Middle East has not yet led to any discernible additional impacts on the cyber threat situation in Germany. This assessment could, however, change at any time due to the dynamic nature of the situation. The authorities are in regular exchange regarding this.

However, the ministry remained vague regarding human rights standards and the vetting of potential partner companies that could be involved in surveillance or military programs. It merely stated that in every cooperation, regardless of the country, “all laws will be complied with.” The BMI did not specify any defined red lines or specific exclusion criteria for companies. According to Köstering, "the possible opening of federal German databases to third countries must be assessed as extremely critical. The federal government currently lacks a convincing concept to protect sensitive datasets from access and utilization by profit-oriented companies – whether for training AI systems or for other purposes.”

The use of AI, “for example for target acquisition,” raises, according to Köstering, “serious human rights and international law questions. In the context of the war in the Gaza Strip, corresponding systems are suspected of having contributed to possible war crimes. Against this background, I consider it irresponsible to even consider such systems without thorough evaluation and independent investigation.”

No Answer on AI Systems

To the explicit question from the MPs whether software from the US company Palantir or AI systems like “Lavender,” used in the Israeli military context, are also being examined for the German Cyber-Dome, the response is: “The federal government generally does not comment publicly on operational details of technical protection facilities of foreign entities (“Third-Party Rule”) in order not to jeopardize the trusting cooperation with its foreign partners.” This leaves it open whether Germany is indirectly entering into new dependencies on controversial US security firms by importing Israeli architecture.

“It is becoming increasingly clear that Palantir can pose a significant risk through data exchange, also due to the authoritarian to autocratic positioning of its owners. Therefore, the federal government should refrain from both domestic cooperation and the purchase of such technology abroad,” says Köstering. Even the existence of shared databases is neither confirmed nor denied, citing national security interests.

The institutional setup is also interesting, as in Israel, civilian cyber defense, military, and intelligence services are closely intertwined, while in Germany, the constitutional principle of separation applies between police and intelligence agencies. The federal government names “primarily the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI), the Central Office for Information Technology in the Security Sector (Zentrale Stelle für Informationstechnik im Sicherheitsbereich, ZITiS), the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), and the Federal Police” as German actors.

Silence on the Role of Intelligence Services

While officially only police and IT security authorities are named as partners, the Ministry of the Interior refuses to provide any information upon inquiry. This includes whether the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) are also integrated into the Cyber-Dome via shared databases. Citing national security interests and the protection of operational methods, it neither confirms nor denies whether German intelligence services are exchanging data with their Israeli counterparts. Through a technical backdoor in the “analysis network,” a mixing of police, intelligence, and military information would be possible, effectively circumventing the German separation principle. Concerns about areas without oversight are growing, for example, due to a recently reported ruling by the Federal Administrative Court. The court had decided that the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit, BfDI) cannot legally enforce its control rights against the BND in case of a dispute. Thus, according to the BfDI, the intelligence service itself can decide what is controlled.

“By answering questions about the use of shared databases between the BfV and foreign intelligence services, conclusions could be drawn about the working methods of the BfV,” the German government's response states, among other things. “A specification regarding any exchange with other authorities could enable affected persons or groups to develop defense strategies and thus make the BfV's intelligence gathering more difficult or, in individual cases, even impossible. This would sustainably impair the functionality of the BfV and thus represent a considerable disadvantage for the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany,” it continues.

(mack)