Crime-as-a-Service: Government warns of highly professional criminal networks

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The days when organized crime (OC) acted as a rigidly structured group are a thing of the past. In its response to an inquiry from the AfD parliamentary group, the federal government paints a picture of a highly flexible, functionally organized criminal economy. The watchword is “Crime-as-a-Service” (CaaS): Criminal groups are increasingly buying specialized services to cover separate sub-processes of their crimes.

Instead of bundling all competencies in-house, modern perpetrator structures act conspiratorially and internationally networked, according to the information. They use state-of-the-art technologies and messenger services to regularly open up new, profitable fields of activity.

Supermarket of the Shadow Economy

In the area of cybercrime, this model has become the standard. According to the lead Interior Ministry, CaaS is an elementary component of this sector. In the digital underground economy, a large part of the components required for cyberattacks are offered as a service. This lowers entry barriers: even technically less experienced actors are enabled to carry out complex attacks.

A prominent example is “Ransomware-as-a-Service”. Here, specialized developers market their malware and make it available to “affiliates” for a fee or a share of the extorted ransom.

One factor in the planning, coordination, and obfuscation of these activities is the use of digital communication and infrastructure systems. The executive emphasizes that these structural developments must be systematically recorded and analyzed to enable effective strategic countermeasures.

Violence on Demand: Insidious Outsourcing

The outsourcing of crime contributions is not limited to the digital world. The government reports an increase in “Violence-as-a-Service.” Here, sometimes the most serious contract crimes such as threats involving explosives, physical violence, or even homicides are coordinated via digital platforms.

The recruitment is particularly shocking, it says: minors and young adults in particular are recruited for these tasks. Sweden is considered to be severely affected and has identified a four-stage recruitment model, ranging from the client via intermediaries to the perpetrator.

The masterminds use targeted risk minimization strategies to protect high-ranking members of the networks and reduce the risk of detection. In addition, addressing young people serves to minimize costs, as they often accept lower remuneration or can be more easily manipulated and exploited. At the same time, the contact networks of these young perpetrators enable criminal groups to gain new access to buyers of, for example, drugs and promote territorial entrenchment. The separation of planning, control, and operational execution makes it difficult to assign responsibility.

Professional Money Laundering and Identity Fraud

In addition, the portfolio of criminal service providers includes offers in the areas of money laundering, forgery, or the provision of technical infrastructure such as encrypted messengers. Although, according to a Europol study, 96 percent of the networks examined still launder their proceeds themselves. However, access to specialized external service providers is becoming more popular. These professionals accept incriminating assets and pay “clean” money to their clients.

Furthermore, OC members increasingly use forged or stolen identity documents to remain undetected and continue their activities for long periods. Here, too, external services are sometimes used if the groups cannot provide these services themselves. This corresponds with an increasing potential for violence, which increasingly brings conflicts between rival groups into the public sphere. The Interior Ministry sees this gradual infiltration of state and society by OC structures as a significant danger.

Strategic Countermeasures

The response of the security authorities consists of more international cooperation. The goal remains the dismantling of criminal structures. It is to be ensured that groupings are financially sustainably hit. According to the strategy, the misuse of state and commercial structures is prevented through close cooperation between various institutions. The government emphasizes that a combination of repressive and preventive approaches is necessary.

At the European level, the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (Empact) coordinates the fight. In the current cycle until 2029, a focus is on identifying and dismantling the most threatening criminal networks and individuals in key positions. Germany integrates findings from this assessment into the strategic evaluation of OC to counter the phenomenon of violence delegation and new digital business models. Empact is thus intended to help break relevant networks permanently.

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