Europe, look at France!
France wants to break free from its dependence on US tech giants. The plan is ambitious, concrete – and overdue. A commentary.
(Image: Tatoh / Shutterstock.com)
France is currently doing in terms of digital sovereignty what Germany and large parts of Europe have failed to do for years: It is acting. Not sometime, not in pilot projects, and not just in Sunday speeches. But now, systematically and at a pace that seems almost revolutionary in European digital policy.
The announcements from Paris are not just another paper that meticulously describes the problem of dependence. Europe has more than enough of those. France is drawing conclusions from the diagnosis. All ministries and their subordinate authorities must present concrete roadmaps by autumn 2026 on how they intend to reduce dependencies. And this across the entire stack: workplace systems, collaboration tools, antivirus software, AI systems, databases, virtualization, and network technology. This is the crucial point. Sovereignty is no longer invoked, but translated into work packages, responsibilities, and deadlines.
This is precisely where the strength of the French approach lies. Paris treats digital sovereignty not as symbolic politics, but as infrastructure policy. It's not about slapping a European logo onto an existing issue somewhere. It's about rebuilding the technological foundation of the state in such a way that dependencies are reduced and switching is even possible. This sounds less glamorous than the next strategy paper. But it is much more relevant.
Start with yourself
The announced switch from Windows to Linux at the digital authority DINUM is a good example of this. One can argue about how quickly and smoothly such a migration succeeds. But the political message is crystal clear: the state starts with its workplaces. It does not just demand digital sovereignty from others, but first addresses its structures. This is exactly how credibility is built.
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More importantly, France is not stopping at the operating system. In parallel, authorities are migrating to state-operated tools for communication and collaboration. The health insurance fund Caisse nationale d'Assurance maladie wants to switch its approximately 80,000 employees to Tchap, Visio, and France Transfert. This is not a nice exercise for a few IT-savvy departments, but scaling. When a state moves on such a scale, it changes markets, operational realities, and expectations. Then facts are created instead of slides.
The look at the health data platform is also particularly revealing. The government had already announced that it would migrate it to a “trusted”, i.e., European-operated solution by the end of 2026. It is precisely here that it becomes clear why digital sovereignty is more than just industrial policy romanticism. Those who permanently depend on external platforms for sensitive health data create not only technical but also political vulnerabilities. France treats this vulnerability as a strategic problem. From a sober perspective, this is simply sensible.
Open standards instead of new dependencies
Furthermore, Paris does not view the issue as replacing one provider with another. This is precisely where serious sovereignty strategies differ from mere replacement procurement. France relies on openly developed software, the “communs numériques”, and on interoperability standards like Open-Interop and OpenBuro. This may sound cumbersome, but it is the real core of the matter. Because sovereign is not simply having a European monopolist in place of an American one. Sovereign is being able to switch components at will without having to rebuild the entire house each time.
Interoperability is therefore not a technical side issue for architect roundtables, but an instrument of power. When interfaces are open and systems remain interchangeable, the cost of switching decreases. And only then does a state regain genuine freedom of decision. France seems to have understood this. It is not only trying to reduce existing lock-ins, but also to prevent the next ones from arising in the same step.
The state as a market shaper
It is also true that Paris does not see the state as a helpless customer, but as a market shaper. The state procurement agency DAE is to map existing dependencies. The economic agency DGE is to define which European digital offerings are available or need to be developed. For June, the first “rencontres industrielles du numérique” are also announced, i.e., industry meetings where public-private partnerships are to be concretized. Behind this lies a simple insight that is surprisingly often forgotten in Europe: a sovereign market does not emerge on its own if the state continues to buy as before and merely hopes for the miracle of a European ecosystem that suddenly materializes.
France reverses this logic. First, the state creates reliable demand. Then, it organizes supply, cooperation, and standards. This is not protectionism out of reflex, but concrete policy for the digital industry. And it is overdue. Because the European debate has long suffered from a strange contradiction: everyone lamented the dependence on non-European providers, but hardly anyone dared to use the instruments with which markets can actually be shifted.
It is fitting that the French initiative brings together several levels. Ministries, authorities, and private companies are to work together in thematic coalitions. This is important because digital sovereignty does not work within departmental boundaries. Those who only modernize administration but do not involve industrial partners are building, at best, isolated solutions. Those who only want to promote European providers but do not create standards and demand, primarily produce press releases. France is at least trying to think both together.
Yes, it can go wrong – but that's no argument
One can critically accompany all of this in many ways. Linux migrations are, based on experience, not a self-runner. Own collaboration tools must be usable for regular users and not just sovereign. Roadmaps are not yet results. And of course, there will be setbacks. No one has ever invented major IT changes without friction. But that is not a counterargument, but simply the normal case. What is decisive is that France no longer uses the effort of practical implementation as an excuse.
Above all, Paris is getting the timing right. Because the old dependencies do not only exist for operating systems, office packages, or cloud services. The next lock-ins are already emerging in AI systems, cross-cutting data platforms, and ultimately all digital infrastructures. Those who only act when these layers have fully solidified will later have to write long strategy papers about lost sovereignty again. France is trying to turn off beforehand. This is also a sign of realism.
Finally serious
In the end, the French course is therefore above all one thing: responsible. It combines political objectives with technical standards, procurement with industrial policy, and symbolism with implementation. France does not merely claim to find digital sovereignty important. It organizes it. With deadlines. With responsibilities. With concrete migrations. And with an honest look at its dependencies.
This is exactly what the urgently needed momentum looks like. Not perfect, not risk-free, but finally serious. And that is precisely why France is currently implementing digital sovereignty quite correctly.
(fo)
